Decisions often involve the consideration of multiple cues, each of which may inform 48 selection on the basis of learned probabilities. Our ability to use probabilistic inference 49 for decisions is bounded by uncertainty and constraints such as time pressure. Previous 50 work showed that when humans choose between visual objects in a multiple-cue, 51 probabilistic task, they cope with time pressure by discounting the least informative 52 cues, an example of satisficing or "good enough" decision-making. We tested two 53 rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) on a similar task to assess their capacity for 54 probabilistic inference and satisficing in comparison with humans. On each trial, a 55 monkey viewed two compound stimuli consisting of four cue dimensions. Each 56 dimension (e.g., color) had two possible states (e.g., red or blue) with different 57 probabilistic weights. Selecting the stimulus with highest total weight yielded higher 58 odds of receiving reward. Both monkeys learned the assigned weights at high accuracy. 59
Introduction 70
Everyday decision-making may require the use of multiple, simultaneous cues with 71 different diagnostic values. A person or animal choosing between pieces of fruit, for 72 example, may assess their ripeness, symmetry, and abrasions; that is, the dimensions 73 of color, shape, and texture. Probabilistically, color may be a better indicator of 74 palatability than shape, which may in turn be more important than texture. In the human 75
Task overview 144
We used the same probabilistic decision-making task as used in Experiments 1 and 2 of 145 Distributions of touches to the target locations were distinct ( Figure 1D ). As soon as a 157 touch was detected, the stimuli disappeared. If the animal earned water reward, it was 158 delivered immediately. After a 2 second inter-trial interval, the central cross re-appeared 159 to start a new trial. Monkeys worked to satiation (~4 hours, several hundred trials/day). 160
In each testing session, a single response window was used that defined the 161 8 time pressure. For "Low Pressure" (LP) sessions, the response window ranged from 162 1.75 to 2 seconds. For "High Pressure" (HP) sessions, the response window ranged 163 from .35 to .50 seconds. We tested hypothesis 1, that macaques use probabilistic 164 inference to choose between stimuli that are each defined by jointly presented, 165 statistically informative visual dimensions, by analyzing data from LP sessions. We 166 tested hypothesis 2, that monkeys make these decisions under time pressure using 167 satisficing strategies, by comparing data between HP and LP sessions. 
Compound visual stimuli and weighting 176
Each visual stimulus was a compound object consisting of four individual visual 177 features, which we refer to as cue dimensions, each of which could take on one of two 178 cue states ( Figure 1A ), as follows. Color dimension: a stimulus could have a blue or red 179 background. Shape dimension: a stimulus could be a circle or a square. Border 180 dimension: a stimulus could be outlined in white or black. Orientation dimension: lines 181 within a stimulus could be horizontal or vertical. Given the combination of these cue 182 dimensions and possible cue states, there were 16 unique compound stimuli ( Figure  183 1C). On a given trial in which two different stimuli were presented, there were therefore 184 120 possible unique pairs of compound stimuli. 185
An optimal decision to select one stimulus over another required evaluation of 186 evidence from the four cue dimensions and a comparison between the two different 187 stimuli. Within a cue dimension (e.g. color), each of the two possible cue states (blue or 188 red) had an assigned weight. The difference between these assigned weights defined 189 the net weight or relative importance for a cue dimension. Table 1 shows all the 190 assigned weights. In experiments with Monkey A, for example, "blue" had an assigned 191 weight of .9 and "red" had an assigned weight of .1, giving the cue dimension "Color" a 192 net weight of .8. At the same time, the cue dimension "Border" had a net weight of .4 193 because the assigned weights for white and black borders were .7 and .3, respectively. 
208
The assigned weights of each cue state were independent and additive, yielding 209 a summed, total weight for each compound stimulus. For each pair of stimuli in a trial, 210 the sum of evidence (SoE) in favor of one stimulus was the difference between its total 211 weight and that of the other stimulus. This SoE was used to calculate the probability of 212 receiving reward after touching a stimulus as follows: 213
For each pair of stimuli, therefore, selecting the one with the positive SoE 215 (greater total weight) resulted in higher, above chance probability of reward; it was the 216 correct decision for optimizing reward. Performance was calculated on the basis of 217 11 making these correct decisions. Trials where the SoE was 0 were ignored when 218 calculating accuracy. Note, monkeys were most likely to receive reward if they selected 219 the stimulus with positive SoE, but because reward was probabilistic, selecting that 220 stimulus might yield no reward, or selecting the other stimulus might be rewarded. This 221 reward contingency encouraged the animals to make their decisions by combining the 222 probabilistic information of the stimuli, rather than on the basis of stimulus-response 223 contingencies. The latter would require memorization of 120 possible pairs of compound 224
stimuli. 225 226

Training 227
To counterbalance our experimental design, the two monkeys learned cue dimensions 228 with reversed order of importance and, within each cue dimension, opposite weighting 229 of cue states (Table 1 
Subjective weights 247
A major goal of our analysis was to infer the subjective importance of the various 248 experimental parameters on each monkey's decision-making. The central analytic 249 approach was to perform a logistic regression using variational Bayesian inference 250 and Down Left-Down Right). Although stimulus location was irrelevant to reward 256 probability, monkeys exhibited varying degrees of preference for certain locations in 257 each location pair, a form of spatial bias likely related to body posture and the arm used. 258
After completing data collection, we calculated the average location preference order 259 across all trials for both monkeys. To keep the direction of location preference 260 consistent between monkeys, the stimulus in the preferred location on a given trial was 261 treated as the positive response in the logistic regression. This was done by first 262 labeling the stimuli in the more and less preferred locations as "stimulus A" and 263 performance to an observer that makes decisions based on sampling from the true 279 posterior, i.e. on the observed probability of outcomes. This idealized decision process 280 would yield SRSS = 1.095 (the norm of the net weights) and, if nothing else affected 281 performance, an accuracy of approximately 79% (the expected probability of reward). 282
Decisions based on inference of the underlying cue weights rather than reward 283 probability would increase SRSS and accuracy above these levels. 284
To isolate relative differences in subjective cue weighting from overall task 285 knowledge, subjective cue weights were then normalized to their SRSS. Finally, the 286 
Decision model comparisons 297
To determine which experimental factors were being utilized for task performance, we 298 pairings. The Bayesian regression described above (Drugowitsch, 2013) was performed 309 15 for all 32 possible decision strategy models to calculate a lower bound on the marginal 310 log probability of each model in each session. To characterize decision strategy across 311 multiple sessions these log model evidences were submitted to a Bayesian model 312 selection procedure (Stephan et al., 2009 ). This approach fits a hierarchical model by 313 treating the decision strategy models as random effects that could vary across sessions 314 and estimates the protected exceedance probabilities, which represent the probability 315 that each given model is more likely than others, corrected for the possibility that 316 observed differences are due to chance (Rigoux et al., 2014) . The model with the 317 highest protected exceedance probability was selected as the preferred decision 318 strategy model for a given monkey and time pressure. Protected exceedance 319 probabilities were calculated using the spm_BMS routine of the SPM12 software suite 320 circles under models 16 and 32 are used to indicate that these models use a "take-the-326 best" strategy, where the highest valued cue dimension that differs between both stimuli is 327 used to make a decision.
329
Results
330
Learning phase 331
Monkeys were initially trained on the low time pressure (LP) version of the task. The 332 learning curve, measured as a fraction of correct responses, is shown for Monkey L in 333 Figure 3A . "Session 1" corresponds to the first day of training. The power law fit shows 334 a rapid increase early in training as the animal began to recognize the probabilistic 335 importance of the different visual stimuli, followed by a more gradual rise toward a 336 steady state plateau. In Figure 3B -D, normalized subjective cue weights are plotted 337 against net weights for three individual sessions (labeled with arrows in Figure 3A) . 338
Note that spatial location was included in these regressions but not depicted here. Early 339 in training, this monkey heavily favored the third cue dimension, which had net weight of 340 0.6, even though the fourth dimension was more informative at net weight 0.8 ( 
358
Through the rest of this report, data from the learning phase were excluded. As 359 an additional criterion, we excluded aborted trials as well as each trial that immediately 360 followed a no-response aborted trial (n = 7,679 trials, 12.9% of all trials for Monkey A; n 361 18 = 13,958 trials, 14.5% of all trials for Monkey L), to include only those trials performed at 362 a similar state of alertness or engagement with the task and allow for an accurate 363 measure of response time. Both monkeys were free to roam in their cage and generally 364 performed the task in "bursts" of trials so this criterion typically excluded the first in a 365
Steady-state behavior at low time pressure 372
Once trained, the monkeys continued to perform low time pressure (LP) sessions 373 (Monkey A: 56 sessions, 27,773 total trials; Monkey L: 51 sessions, 57,772 total trials). 374
In these LP trials, Monkey A selected the correct stimulus at a rate of 86.0% and 375
Monkey L was correct at 86.5%, with mean response times of 399 ms and 634 ms, 376 respectively. Across these trials, both monkeys accurately discriminated between 377 features in all four visual cue dimensions by inferring the correct order of subjective cue 378 (Figure 4 ). All subjective cue weights were significantly different in a monotonic rising 379 progression as a function of net weights (statistics are in the Satisficing section and 380 numerical data are in Table 2 associated with that section). Recall that the assigned 381 dimension order of importance and within-dimension cue feature weights were 382 counterbalanced between Monkeys A and L, so the ordering was not a salience artifact 383 in monkeys (e.g., if Color happened to be easier to discern than Orientation of the 384 19 lines). Both monkeys had an average SRSS of subjective cue weights much greater 385 than 1.095, implying that they used probabilistic inference of cue weights to improve 386 accuracy above the expected reward rate (see Methods). 387 388 
408
The degradation of performance in HP trials coincided with a decreased ability of 409 the monkeys to utilize and discriminate between the cue features. Figure 5 shows the 410 psychometric functions between the proportion of trials a stimulus was selected 411 (ordinate) vs. its SoE (abscissa). The greater the SoE of a stimulus (recall eq. 1), the 412 more likely it was to be selected. The slope at the inflection point is a measure of the 413 perceptual sensitivity to SoE as a factor in performance. In HP sessions ( Figure 5 , white 414 circles), the psychometric slopes clearly decreased relative to LP sessions ( Figure 5 , 415 21 gray circles), for both monkeys. That is, under time pressure, performance was still 416 driven by SoE, but with less sensitivity to it. 417
Multiple hypotheses could account for these effects of time pressure on 418 performance. One possibility is that the monkeys occasionally made cue-independent 419 decisions in HP trials due to lapses in attention (Wichmann & Hill, 2001 ). This predicts, 420
however, that the psychometric curves would not asymptote to zero or one, and yet they 421 the decision-making process. This would predict a decrease in the SRSS of 430 subjective cue weights under time pressure, with no effect on the relative 431 strengths or ordering of the normalized subjective cue weights. 432 3. Biased priors When evidence is weak due to time pressure, subjects might rely 433 more on a priori preferences. Here, we consider priors on stimulus locations, i.e. 434 the animals' spatial biases. Biases toward these priors under time pressure 435 would predict increases in the SRSS of subjective spatial weights. 436
These three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. In the following sections, we 437 consider the evidence for each of them. 438 22
439
Satisficing 440
As a first step in determining whether the monkeys used satisficing strategies to change 441 their relative weighting of cue dimensions under time pressure, we directly compared 442 the individual subjective cue weights between LP and HP sessions (Figure 6) . 443
Specifically, the precision-weighted means of each (normalized) subjective cue weight 444 was compared four times: between the cue dimensions within the LP or HP condition 445 (three comparisons), and between the LP and HP condition for each cue dimension 446 (one comparison), yielding a corrected criterion level of p < .0125. The null hypothesis -447 no effect of time pressure, i.e. HP condition -predicts significant differences for the first 448 three comparisons (clear ordering of the subjective cue weights) but no significant 449 difference for the fourth comparison (no effect of the HP condition on subjective cue 450 weights). In Figure 6 , we label each result that deviated from this null hypothesis. Table 2 . Data shown in Figure 6 , plus effect sizes (Cohen's d) for HP-LP difference at each net weight.
479
We then examined whether this "group-the-best" effect was present at the level 480 of individual sessions. For each session we calculated the difference in subjective cue 481 weights for the .6 and .8 cue dimensions. Smaller differences would represent closer 482 subjective weights and more of a grouping effect. We found that these differences were model selection analyses to infer how strategies changed in HP vs. LP conditions. This 495 25 approach evaluates strategies that involve using subsets of the visual cues (Figure 2) . 496
Under time pressure, humans consistently resorted to a "drop-the-worst" satisficing 497 strategy (Oh et al., 2016 ). We applied the same analysis to the data from our monkeys 498 across all experimental sessions in the HP and LP conditions. Figure 7 illustrates the 499 protected exceedance probabilities calculated for each decision model strategy. For 500
Monkey A (Figure 7A ), the maximum marginal likelihood strategy in the LP condition 501 (gray bars) was model 31, in which all four cue dimensions are used with spatial bias. 502
Under time pressure (HP condition, white bars), however, Monkey A shifted to model 503 27, the "drop-the-worst" strategy with spatial bias. Monkey L ( Figure 7B ) did not exhibit 504 a significant shift in strategy that could be captured by these models. Its preferred 505 strategy for LP and HP was model 31. In sum, both animals used a "group-the-best" 506 satisficing strategy for probabilistic decision-making under time pressure, as described 507 above, but Monkey A also used a "drop-the-worst" strategy as found for humans. 508 509 
Decision noise 513
To evaluate whether increases in decision noise affected performance in HP sessions, 514
we calculated the average SRSS of the subjective cue weights for LP and HP sessions 515 for both monkeys (Figure 8 ). In this pooled data, the average SRSS decreased 516 significantly in HP sessions for Monkey L (Figure 8 
Biased priors 531
If monkeys were spatially unbiased, we would expect an even distribution of stimulus 532 location selections. However, even in LP sessions, both monkeys showed consistent 533 spatial preferences (Figure 9A , gray). They were biased toward selecting stimuli in the 534 upper two quadrants of the screen and to the right for Monkey A or the left for Monkey 535 L. This is counterproductive because stimulus locations are irrelevant to the probability 536 of receiving reward. The reasons for these biases are unknown but may relate to 537 individual handedness or postures while using the touchscreen. In HP sessions ( Figure  538 9A, white), the innate spatial biases were accentuated. The resulting reduction in 539 performance was evident upon recalculating the psychometric functions of Figure 5 with 540 respect to selection of the stimulus in each pair that was at the more-preferred location 541 
558
Response time effects 559
One consequence of time pressure is shortened durations for viewing the stimuli. 560
Having less time to see the stimuli could, by itself, worsen performance metrics such as 561 accuracy, decision noise, and spatial bias. Viewing duration had an upper bound of the 562 29 response window, but on any particular trial it was truncated by the monkey's response 563 time (latency between onset of the stimuli and touching the screen). Therefore, we 564 compared data from LP and HP trials matched by response times, and thus viewing 565 times, to see whether the effects of time pressure on accuracy, decision nose, and 566 spatial bias were still present (Figure 10 ). For a list of all the numerical data from Figure  567 10, see Table 3 (in Appendix 2). Specifically, we compared performance accuracy 568 caveat, however, is that not all macaques react to high time pressure with the human 759 "drop-the-worst" strategy. If the aim is to test that form of satisficing, monkeys should be 760 pre-screened to find those that exhibit it. Comparing neural activity between satisficing 761 strategies would be informative too, and macaques appear to provide the opportunity to 762 compare at least the "drop-the-worst" and "group-the-best" strategies, sometimes in the 763 same subject (such as Monkey A in our study). 764
765
Conclusion 766
The present work explored the psychophysics of making decisions between objects 767 based on probabilistic visual cues in rhesus macaques. We found similarities between 768 macaque behavior and previously reported human behavior, in that both species can 769 perform probabilistic discrimination between visual stimuli and can satisfice under time 770 pressure, in some cases even using the same strategy ("drop-the-worst"). We found 771 differences as well, likely reflecting a mix of real inter-species differences and necessary 772 task design and sample size differences. Future work that compares macaques and 773 humans with even more closely-matched experiments, complemented by computational 774 models that probe and compare the underlying algorithms used by each species, would 775 help to address unresolved issues. Overall, our results provide support for using 776 macaques to study the neural basis of probabilistic decision-making and satisficing 777 
